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THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE LAWFULLY
ADMITTED PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN: THE
INHERENT LIMITS OF THE POWER TO EXPEL*
SIEGFRIED HESSEt
[O]nce you start a mistake, the trouble is done
and you never know what is going to come of it,
Mark Twain 1
As has been demonstrated, prior to 1917 no statute authorized the expul-
sion, for postentry conduct, of aliens not considered initially excludable.2 Con-
sequently, none of the pre-1917 cases had actually considered the constitu-
tional power of Congress to expel the lawfully admitted long-term resident
alien, whose postentry behavior does not support a presumption of erroneous
or illegal entry.
THE ROAD TO BANISHMENT
Legislation-1917-1939
With respect to ejection, 3 the form of the Act of February 5, 1917, 4 marked
a new departure. Instead of providing for generally applicable limited time
periods within which excludability had to be shown, as did sections 20 and 21
of the 1907 act,5 the 1917 act specified the grounds for expulsion-and their
concomitant time limits or lack thereof-separately. And with the exception
of provisions affecting limited classes,6 it abandoned the approach of former
*The second of two Articles by the author. The first appears in volume 68 at page
1578.
tManaging Legal Editor, California Continuing Education of the Bar. The views ex-
pressed here are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of either the
State Bar of California or the University of California Extension, which administers the
program.
1. TWAIN, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR's COURT 124 (Modern Library
ed. 1917).
2. See Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resi-
dent Alien: The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578, 1610-18 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases]. The Supreme Court recognized this fact in Kessler v.
Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 31 (1939).
3. For purposes of this Article, "ejection" is "the expulsion of . . . [an alien] who
either entered illegally, or who, within a reasonable time after entry, committed acts justi-
fying the conclusion that entry was erroneously allowed." "Banishment" means the expul-
sion of "one who committed an act which either by its nature, or by its temporal remote-
ness to entry, affords no basis for a presumption of initial excludability." "Expulsion" in-
cludes both ejection and banishment. Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1580-81.
4. Ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874.
5. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, §§ 20, 21, 34 Stat. 904-05.
6. E.g., alien seamen. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 34, 39 Stat. 896.
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section 3, which had provided that aliens committing expellable acts within
the specified time period "shall be deemed to be unlawfully within the United
States."7 Section 19 of the 1917 act simply set up classes of expellable aliens
who were to be "taken into custody and deported." These textual changes
obscured the fundamental distinction between provisions specifying the time
within which initial excludability could be proved, and provisions defining
those "expellable acts" which operated as substitutes for such proof.0
Nonetheless, portions of the legislative history tend to show that the re-
drafting was not meant to effect any substantive change in the theory upon
which postentry ejection was based. The Scnatc Report stated that:
[The purpose of the change] is to make perfectly clear the intent to con-
tinue the practice established when the act of 1907 was passed of expell-
ing from the United States every alien who, after having secured admis-
sion in one way or another, was found here within the period of limita-
tion fixed and was found to have been at the time of his entry a member
of any one of the list of classes enumerated in section 2 of the said act,
10
The Report also noted that in many cases the Suprene Court had regarded
deportation as deferred exclusion."' Thus, it would seem that section 19 was
intended to deal only with the illegally or erroneously admitted alien.
In commenting on the elimination of generally applicable time limitations,
however, the Report took a broad view of congressional power. It was an-
nounced that the policies of the Act of March 26, 1910, providing for de-
portation of prostitutes, procurers, and the like, without regard to time of
entry, were being extended to cover other undesirable classes, such as anar-
chists122 The Report asserted that these 1910 provisions had been "emphati-
cally and distinctly upheld" by the Supreme Court,13 and implied that exten-
sion of this policy to other classes was equally proper. In effect, this amounted
to a claim that whenever Congress found the conduct of certain classes of
aliens undesirable, it could equate undesirability with proof of initial exclud-
ability and therefore apply expulsion provisions unlimited in time. Disre-
7. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 900.
8. Ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889-90.
9. Some grounds for expulsion were related to initial excludability in express terms.
E.g., the public charge provision: "any alien who within five years after entry becomes a
public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent to landing."
Ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889. But in defining other expellable classes, such as prostitutes, no
reference to initial excludability was made.
10. S. REsP. No. 352, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1916). Compare Congress' 1950 view of
the 1917 act: "[It] made radical changes in requiring the deportation after entry in an ex-
tensive class of cases and in permitting deportation without time limitation in certain cases."
S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1950).
11. S. REP. No. 352, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1916).
12. Id. at 15.
13. Ibid. The case cited in support of this statement. Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78
(1914), did not involve the 1910 provisions.
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garded in this assertion of power were the facts that the 1910 legislation had
been based in part on a finding that illegally or erroneously admitted prosti-
tutes avoided expulsion by lying about time of entry, thus making it necessary
to remove the time limitations in order to expel all those initially exclud-
able,14 and that the cases upholding this legislation "r did not involve aliens
who were able to prove that they were not initially excludable. 10
Thus, while Congress still purported to recognize that ejection was delayed
exclusion, it denied that a causal connection between preentry characteristics
and postentry conduct was necessarily relevant to the exercise of the ejection
power, and, accordingly, actually divorced ejection from excludability. More-
over, by eliminating old section 3's express language showing the presumption
of initial excludability upon which postentry expulsion was originally based,
Congress gave section 19 the appearance of a number of special statutes of
limitation. As a consequence, time limitation periods readily became accepted
as the boundaries of the Government's grace rather than of the extent of its
power.
The Act of October 16, 1918,17 in effect an amendment of the 1917 act,18
eliminated the five-year limitation period for aliens who were anarchists at
entry, expanded the excludable classes, and made membership in these classes
cause for expulsion in all cases, thus extending the grounds for expulsion be-
yond those prescribed in the 1917 act.19 One of the purposes of the 1918 act
was to eliminate the necessity of proving that those who had been anarchists
at entry, but who were not expellable because of five years' residence, had
later committed an expellable act.20 But nothing in the 1918 act or its amend-
ments 21 goes beyond the congressional view, expressed in the 1917 act, of
the basis and scope of legislative power.
22
Up to 1920, the grounds for exclusion had been qualitative, not quantita-
tive.2 In 1921, however, quota provisions were enacted as an emergency
measure,24 and in 1924 became a permanent part of United States immigra-
14. See Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1617 nn.248-49.
15. E.g., Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913).
16. See Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1621-25.
17. Ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012.
18. H.R. REP. No. 645, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1918).
19. See Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 32 (1939). The changes in the exclusion pro-
vision were purportedly only what Congress had intended by the more general language
of the 1917 act. See H.R. REP. No. 645, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1918).
20. Id. at 2-3.
21. Act of June 5, 1.920, ch. 251, 41 Stat. 1008. The 1920 act was enacted for the pur-
pose of circumventing the Secretary of Labor's ruling that IWW membership was not per
se an expellable act. See H.R. REP. No. 504, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1919).
22. The only other expulsion legislation of this period, the Act of May 10, 1920, ch.
174, 41 Stat. 593, authorized expulsion of those convicted of certain war crimes. For a dis-
cussion of this legislation, see Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1584-86.
23. The literacy requirement in the 1917 act, however, actually had the effect of ex-
cluding quantitatively; it was on this ground that President Wilson vetoed H.R. 6060, 63d
Cong., 3d Sess. (1915). See H.R. Doc. No. 1527, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. 4 (1915).
24. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5.
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tion law.25 While quota exclusion did not replace qualitative exclusion, quota
enforcement, which produced a race to the ports by both shipping companies
and immigrants, 26 compelled Congress to establish, in the 1924 act, a uniform
system of preexamination.27 Every lawful immigrant now was required to
have a visa, which for all practical purposes established both time and man-
ner of entry.28 Accordingly, the 1924 act shifted the burden of proof of these
matters in deportation proceedings to the immigrant.3 Moreover, the appli-
cation for the required visa established whether a prospective entrant was
coming for temporary or permanent residence.30
These changes in the regulation of entry into the United States not only
simplified the process of exclusion, but they eliminated the original justifica-
tion for the adoption of postentry expulsion provisions unlimited in time.31
With time, place, and manner of entry now generally determinable, the extent
of congressional power to eliminate time limitations on the raising of pre-
sumptions of excludability from postentry conduct ceases to be a question of
the practical difficulty of proof of time of entry, but becomes solely one of how
far back in time such a presumption can rationally be extended. But, prior to
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,32 the cases involving the post-1917 legislation
brought forth no substantial challenge to congressional power. The textual
shift made in 1917 had submerged the question, and the lack of limits soon
became an accepted constitutional axiom.
Judicial Erosion of the Constitutional Status of the Resident Alien
Ng Fung Ho: Reconsidering the Status of the Illegal Entrant
Ng Fung Ho v. White 33 presented the question whether Chinese persons
who had entered in violation of the Chinese Exclusion Acts prior to the 1917
act could be deported under the administrative procedures prescribed in the
latter act.3 4 Prior to the 1917 act, the Supreme Court had held that judicial
25. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (reenacted in scattered sections of
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1958)).
26. H.R. REP. No. 176, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1924).
27. "The use of immigration certificates affords not only a ready and appropriate means
of enforcing the numerical limitation, but a proper and reasonable method of exmining
the intending immigrant before he sets sail for the United States." Ibid.
28. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 7, 43 Stat. 156-57.
29. Ch. 190, § 23, 43 Stat. 165-66. It has been suggested that once the alien has proved
time and manner of entry, the burden of proving his e-pellability shifts to the Government.
See Developments in the Lrm--Immngration ad Nationality, 66 HIAv. L. Rzv. 643, 693
n.380 (1953) ; cf. United States ex rel Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273
U.S. 103, 110 (1927).
30. Ch. 190, § 7(b), 43 Stat 156.
31. See Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1617 nn248-49.
32. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
33. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
34. This clearly was the result Congress intended. See S. REP. No. 352, 64th Cong.,
1st Sess. 14 (1916).
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proceedings were necessary for ejection based on violation of the Chinese
Exclusion Acts.3 5 Mr. Justice Brandeis, however, apparently regarded that
case as an interpretation of the Exclusion Acts and not as a determination of
a possible constitutional issue.
The mere fact that at the time petitioners last entered the United States
they could not have been deported except by judicial proceedings presents
no constitutional obstacle to their expulsion by executive order now.
Neither . . . claims to be a citizen of the United States. Congress has
power to order at any time the deportation of aliens whose presence in
the country it deems hurtful; and may do so by appropriate executive
proceedings. Bugajewitz v. Adams . . . Lapina v. Williams . . . Lewis
v. Frick . . . . Our task, therefore, so far as concerns these two peti-
tioners, is merely to ascertain the intention of Congress.8
0
This portion of the opinion, often relied on to support the power of Congress
to expel,3 7 is readily seen to have considered only procedural due process, not
substantive limits to the expulsion power. Indeed, since the aliens involved
had been residents less than five years,3 8 no serious substantive question could
have arisen.
More difficulty arises from Mr. Justice Brandeis' interpretation of the 1917
act as not requiring retrospective application. He reached this conclusion by
arguing that unlawful entry and unlawful remaining were separate offenses.80
The cases cited in support of this position, however, all involved presumptive-
ly unlawful entrants under the Chinese Exclusion Acts, which prescribed the
means of proof of lawful entry.40 In Brandeis' opinion, the failure to prove
lawful entry became an unlawful remaining. Such a formulation can be ap-
proved only so long as it is recognized that the unlawful remaining relates to
the initial right to enter, a connection not made by Brandeis.41 The attempt
to draw a distinction between unlawful entry and unlawful remaining tended
to obscure the basis upon which the power to expel rests. Although Ng Fung
35. United States v. Woo Jan, 245 U.S. 552 (1918).
36. 259 U.S. at 280.
37. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 532 (1954) ; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
524, 534 n.18 (1952).
38. 259 U.S. at 278.
39. 259 U.S. at 280-81.
40. The cases in the order cited were Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893) ; Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901) ; Ah How v. United States, 193
U.S. 65 (1904). For a discussion of the view of the Chinese Exclusion Acts taken here,
see Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1591-97, 1612-13.
41. Since Ng Fung Ho himself was admittedly an illegal entrant, see Ng Fung Ho
v. White, 266 Fed. 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1920), no constitutional problem could have arisen
with respect to him even if the act had been said to apply retrospectively. Cf. Johannessen
v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912) (one who obtained citizenship by fraud cannot object
on grounds of retroactivity to legislation which deprives him of it). Ng Ptung Ho, in the
Supreme Court, also dealt with two Chinese who claimed to be citizens. Brandeis held
that they were entitled to a judicial hearing since they were within the United States, and
not attempting to enter. 259 U.S. at 282.
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Ho actually dealt with illegal entrants and concerned a procedural issue, it
eroded the constitutional status of the long-term lawful resident through broad
language and strained, unrealistic, and unnecessary conceptual analysis.
The Anarchist Cases
Ng Fung Ho was followed by a series of cases involving anarchists.42 Al-
though two involved aliens who had been residents for nine and ten years
when arrested,43 in none was the power of Congress to expel questioned.
Relying instead on alleged violations of procedural due process, the aliens
were uniformly unsuccessful in avoiding expulsion.
Mahler v. Eby: Retroactive Conditions in Wartnie
Mahler v. Eby,44 discussed elsewhere in relation to the war power,4 is
significant as a part of the process of growing acceptance of unlimited con-
gressional power. Although immediate expulsion was avoided on a technical-
ity, the Court in effect upheld for the first time the retroactive imposition of
new grounds for expulsion, unrelated to preentry characteristics-the portions
of the 1920 act involved 4 6 prescribed deportation for aliens convicted of cer-
tain war crimes and for internees. The basis of this act, however, was quite
reasonable, since it merely imposed on the resident alien the condition that he
refrain from detrimental wartime criminal activity, a condition probably im-
plied at the time of entry.
4 7
The Reentry Cases
A final class of cases which arose during this same period invoked the re-
entry doctrine-the theory that each time an alien returns to the United
States after an absence abroad, his most recent entry is considered controlling
for exclusion and expulsion purposes .4  Given this starting point, the cases
are not inconsistent with the theory that expulsion for postentry acts depends
on the reasonableness of basing a presumption of excludability at time of entry
42. United States ex reL. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103
(1927) ; United States ex reL. lensevich v. Tod, 264 U.S. 134 (1924) ; United States ex
reL. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924) ; United States cx rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S.
149 (1923).
43. United States ex reL. Mensevich v. Tod, supra note 42 (ten years) ; United States
ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, supra note 42 (nine years).
44. 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
45. Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1584-85.
46. Act of May 10, 1920, ch. 174, § 1, 41 Stat. 593-94.
47. Compare Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 826, 834-35 (No. 5126) (C.C.D. Pa. 1799)
(Alien Act of 1798).
48. The theory was developed in the cases of Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. -91 (1914);
Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78 (1914). It originated in Chae Chan Ping Y. United States
(The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). See Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1589
n.86.
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on these acs.4 9 But when the alien's previous residence has been lengthy, the
reentry doctrine simply serves to blur the constitutional issues which might
be raised. For example, in United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith,5 0 the alien had
entered in 1906 at the age of sixteen. In 1925, he had been convicted of
counterfeiting and had served his sentence. Not only was he immune from
expulsion under the then existing statute,5 1 but no reasonable presumption of
initial excludability seems inferrable from this particular postentry conduct.
When Volpe made a short trip to Cuba in 1928, he was readmitted, but in
1930 the Immigration Service instituted deportation proceedings against him,
on the grounds that at the time of his second entry he had been excludable
as one who had committed a crime involving moral turpitude prior to entry.
These proceedings were upheld, the Supreme Court viewing the case as easily
settled by the application of the reentry doctrine 2 Thus, no significant chal-
lenge to congressional expulsion power was made in the reentry cases, and,
although the opinions indicated a growing acceptance of congressional omnip-
otence,53 the issue of power to banish remained unconsidered and therefore
should have been regarded as unsettled.
An Uncontested Banishment
The first case involving facts which would have clearly presented the issue
of the substantive limits of congressional power under the conditional-entry
theory was Costanzo v. Tillinghast, decided in 1932.14 Costanzo had entered
as an infant in 1905 and was arrested for deportation as the manager of a
house of prostitution in 1926. Thus, as applied to him, the 1917 act involved
both retrospective application and an unreasonable presumption of initial ex-
cludability. But, during the fifteen years between the passage of the 1917 act
and the arrival before the Court of a genuine banishment case, the concept of
unlimited congressional power had become an accepted premise.
Counsel for Costanzo contended before the court of appeals that the pro-
posed banishment constituted a cruel and inhuman punishment, since the alien
49. See, e.g., United States ex tel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398 (1929) (manslaughter
committed within three years of last entry deportable act).
50. 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
51. The Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889, provided for expulsion if the
alien was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years after entry.
52. 289 U.S. at 425-26.
53. See, e.g., id. at 425.
54. 287 U.S. 341 (1932). The facts in Costanzo are set forth in the court of appeals'
opinion. Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 56 F.Zd 566 (1st Cir. 1932).
Admittedly there had been a residence of nine years in United States ex rel. Bilokumsky
v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923), and one of ten years in United States cx rte. Mensevich v.
Tod, 264 U.S. 134 (1924), but the ground for expulsion in those cases was political activ-
ity, which is a matter of adult thought. The age at time of entry was not indicated in either
case. If at time of entry the petitioners had been adults, their subsequent conduct might
reasonably be related to their preentry beliefs. If they had entered as infants or children,
however, their expulsions were banishments.
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had resided here continuously since entry and was the father of native-born
citizens.55 The court of appeals upheld the expulsion with a reluctant con-
currence by one judge who felt that the preferable construction of the statute
was to hold -the five-year statute of limitations applicable to all deportable
acts except when specifically eliminated by the phrase "at any time after
entry." A deportation statute without limitation, he said, gave rise to "possi-
bilities of shocking cruelty."5 6
Although the concurring judge's interpretation was a permissible reading
of the 1917 act's rather careless draftsmanship, it ran contrary to congres-
sional intentY7 Yet statutory interpretation was the only issue relied on before
the Supreme Court, where the constitutional issue was abandoned.5s The
Court, employing an involved and largely erroneous process of statutory con-
struction,59 correctly held that Congress intended to provide for the ex-pulsion
of aliens found owning or managing a house of prostitution at any time after
entry.60 Thus, banishment was approved virtually by default.
Sumn ary
The difficulty, if not impossibility, of proving time of entry during the first
decade of this century led Congress to eliminate the time limitations within
which a conclusive presumption of erroneous admittance could be raised with
respect to practicing prostitutes and procurers. 01 This was done despite the
fact that Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in Keller v. United States 0 had in-
dicated that the entire Court felt that the power to regulate immigration did
not subsume unlimited power to regulate postentry conduct of resident
aliens.6 While the cases which first arose under this legislation did not pre-
sent factual situations which tested the extent of congressional power," they
could be interpreted as upholding unlimited power over resident aliens. Mis-
led by this interpretation, Congress, in the 1917 act, undertook what amounted
to regulation of postentry conduct unrelated to its power to exclude, although
it still paid lip service to the theoretical necessity of a causal relationship be-
tween postentry conduct and preentry characteristics or conditions. When the
Court was finally presented with a case whose facts could legitimately have
tested the inherent limits of the power to expel, congressional omnipotence
was generally conceded, although the Court had never considered the prob-
55. Costanzo v. Tillinghast, supra note 54, at 567.
56. 56 F.2d at 568 (concurring opinion).
57. See S. Rxr. No. 352, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1916) (limitation period indicated
if provided).
58. 287 U.S. at 342.
59. 287 U.S. at 344-45. Compare this interpretation of the third proviso of § 19 of the
1917 act with Ng Fung Ho v. White, 266 Fed. 765, 767 (9th Cir. 1920).
60. 287 U.S. at 345.
61. See Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1617 nn.248-49.
62. 213 U.S. 138, 149-51 (1909) (dissenting opinion).
63. See Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1605-09.
64. See notes 15, 16 supra and accompanying text.
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lem of banishment on its merits. And with its power to expel well accepted,
Congress' next step was to legislate with the specific object of banishment.
This was begun in 1940.
BANISHMENT OF THE RESIDENT ALIEN
There is nothing new in this notion of the subordination of legal
concepts to expediency and justice, though as with nany an old
truth there is need to restate it now and again ....
Mr. Justice Cardozo 05
Legislative Exercise of Power
In 1939, after Kessler v. Strecker 66 had held that past membership in the
Communist Party was not a valid ground for expulsion, those who sought
the deportation of Mr. Harry Bridges 6 promptly introduced a bill in the
House which provided that "notwithstanding any other provision of law"
Bridges, "whose presence in this country the Congress deems hurtful," be
expelled.68 A Senate Committee, however, determined that the bill presented
serious constitutional problems as a bill of attainder 0 As a substitute, 0 Con-
65. CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENcE 64 (1928), in SELEcrED WITINGS 289
(Hall ed. 1947).
66. 307 U.S. 22 (1939).
67. Some congressmen were so irate at the frustration of Bridges' expulsion that there
was an attempt to impeach the Secretary of Labor and several subordinate officials for
granting a stay of his expulsion proceeding pending the Court's decision in Kessler. See
H.R. REP. No. 311, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1.939). Deportation had been ordered for past
membership in the Communist Party in United States e.r ret. Yokinen v. Commissioner
of Immigration, 57 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1932).
68. H.R. 9766, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). This probably marks the highwater mark
of the misconception of Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion in Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585
(1913). The Senate minority report concerning this bill demonstrates the extent to which
the view of congressional omnipotence had expanded: ". . . Congress, in permitting im-
migration, merely accords aliens the privilege or license of residing in this country; and
regardless of the length of thie of such residence, the privilege never ripens hito a vested
right to renzain." S. REP. No. 2031, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 2, at 5 (1940). (Emphasis
added.) The power was claimed to be "inherent in sovereignty," and several cases were
quoted totally out of legislative and historical context. Id. at 5-9.
69. Id., pt. 1, at 6-8. The Committee relied heavily on a communication from the then
Attorney General Robert H. Jackson which stated in part:
One of our great tasks is to assimilate them [resident aliens] into our native culture;
this can only be done by a deep respect for our processes and traditions. How shall
we teach this respect if the Government itself will not abide by a decision in an in.
dividual case, and makes acts whose nature is not specified, and which must have
been lawful when done, the basis of deportation without hearing? .. .The interests
of this service can be best protected by enactment of clear and fair rules of conduct
that aliens may know, so that those who obey may be unmolested and those who dis-
obey may be expelled. And let any man be heard in his own behalf before he is
doomed to exile.
Id. at 9-10.




gress enacted section 23 of the Alien Registration Act of 1940,71 which pro-
vided in general terms that past membership in an organization advocating
the overthrow of the Government by force or violence %was an ex-pellable act.
While Bridges successfully eluded this congressional net72 other long-term
residents have been subsequently banished pursuant to its provisions.73
The Government still had the burden of establishing that the organization
involved advocated the overthrow of the Government by force or violence.
This requirement was eliminated, for the Communist Party, by the Internal
Security Act of 1950.74 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,75
Congress' most recent expression on this subject, although it added few new
grounds for expulsion, did extend the assertion of the power to banish long-
term residents in certain respects.7"
Judicial Acceptance of Congressional Power
In the present decade, for the first time, banishment of American residents
was squarely upheld. The decisive decisions are Carlson v. Landon,71 Hari-
siades v. Shaughnessy," and Galvan v. Press,70 all predicated on the errone-
ous assumption that the issue had been settled, if not by Fong Yue Ting v.
71. Ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (Title III of this act is now Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952, §§ 261-66, 66 Stat. 223-26, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1301-06 (1958) ; Title II of this
act is now covered by 66 Stat. 204-08, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1958).).
72. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). The Court circumvented any major con-
stitutional questions on the basis of the insubstantiality of the evidence, and the meaning of
"affiliation." Mir. Justice Murphy, however, explored the substantive due process issues in-
volved. Id. at 157-66.
73. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
Section 20 of the Alien Registration Act of 1940 added to § 19 of the 1917 act a sub-
section (b) which added five expulsion provisions, dealing with smugglers of aliens, un-
lawful possessors of firearms, and violators of the Registration Act. Ch. 439, 54 Stat. 671-
72.
74. Ch. 1024, § 22, 64 Stat. 1006-10 (1950) (reenacted in scattered sections of Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1958)).
75. 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 125L(a) (1958).
76. While the former law provided for expulsion within five years of entry for being
excludable at the time of entry, there is -now no time limitation. Clause 1, 66 Stat. 204, 8
U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1) (1958). Expulsion for entry without inspection or by fraud which
was formerly limited to three years of entry, may likewise now be effectuated any time
after entry. Clause 2, 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2) (1958). Moreover, while the
provisions of the 1920 act required both the commission of certain wartime offenses and a
finding of undesirableness as a resident, which could not necessarily be inferred from the
conviction alone, Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924), under the present provision expulsion
is prescribed for those "the Attorney General finds to be an undesirable resident of the
United States by reason of any of the" designated convictions, clause 17, 66 Stat. 207, 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a) (17) (1958).
77. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
78. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
79. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
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United States80 in 1893, at least by Bugajewitz v. Adams,81 twenty years
later.
The unqualified acceptance of the power to banish was foreshadowed in
some of the cases preceding Harisiades.8 2 At the same time, there were sev-
eral cases which, despite legislative disapproval of Kessler, continued to apply
the strict construction rule and other devices to expulsion provisions in order
to avoid unjust results.8 3 Of particular interest is Jordan v. DeGeorge,84 in
which the Court, on its own motion,85 applied the void-for-vagueness rule to
the section of the statute providing for expulsion for the commission of two
crimes involving "moral turpitude" at any time after entry.80 Although this
rule ordinarily applies only to criminal laws, it was here applied to the ex-
pulsion statutes in view of the "grave nature of deportation."8 7
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson briefly noted the purpose of the rule, maintain-
ing a verbal distinction between the expulsion laws and criminal statutes:
The essential purpose of the "void for vagueness" doctrine is to warn
individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct . . . . [But] it
should be emphasized that this statute does not declare certain conduct
to be criminal. Its function is to apprise aliens of the consequences which
follow after conviction and sentence of the requisite two crimes.
The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning
as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding
and practices.88
Applying this test, the majority held the moral turpitude clause valid. But
there were vigorous dissenting views in an opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson, 0
80. 149 U.S. 698 (1893) ; see Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cascs 1591-97.
81. 228 U.S. 585 (1913) ; see Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cascs 1618-25.
82. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770-71 (1950) (reference to "probation-
ary residence") ; United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521, 529 (1950)
("There is no question as to the power of Congress to enact a statute to deport aliens be-
cause of past misconduct" ).
83. For examples of the strict construction technique, see Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,
333 U.S. 6 (1948) ; Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947).
84. 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
85. Id. at 229.
86. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889-90 (now Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, § 241(a) (4), 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (4) (1958)).
87. 341 U.S. at 231.
88. Id. at 230-32.
89. Id. at 232-45. Jackson noted the Government's contention that the "statute is one
by which it is 'sought to reach the confirmed criminal, whose criminality has been revealed
in two serious penal offenses.'" Id. at 235. The Government's argument here indicates that
the rationale of the moral turpitude provision is that conduct reveals characteristics. So
viewed, expulsion is not punishment for conduct. But the relevant question is, for what
characteristics is expulsion a valid regulatory sanction?
Mr. Justice Jackson argued that the phrase "moral turpitude" was meaningless as a
warning, and therefore unconstitutional. He concluded:
We have said that deportation is equivalent to banishment or exile. Deportation pro-
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who one year later authored Harisiades. Leaving aside the inconsistency of
Jackson's position, the fact remains that the theory that reasonable notice is
necessary in expulsion statutes, accepted by the entire Court in DeGeorge, is
incompatible with the rule, confirmed in Harisiades, that the ex post facto
clause does not apply to expulsion laws.
Carlson v. Landon: Assumption and Precedent
The view that the scope of congressional expulsion power was virtually
unlimited was announced explicitly in Carlson v. Landon.0 Although the
precise issue involved in that case was the validity of the detention of present
Communists without bond pending ultimate determination of the right to
expel,91 Mr. Justice Reed took occasion to expound the majority's conception
of the more basic expulsion power :902
The basis for the deportation of presently undesirable aliens resident in
the United States is not questioned and requires no reexamination. When
legally admitted, they have come at the Nation's invitation, as visitors or
permanent residents, to share with us the opportunities and satisfactions
of our land. As such visitors and foreign nationals they are entitled in
their persons and effects to the protection of our laws. So long, however,
as aliens fail to obtain and maintain citizenship by naturalization, they
remain subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them under
the sovereign right to determine what noncitizens shall be permitted to
remain within our borders.0
3
But if the previous analysis is correct, none of the six cases cited 04 in sup-
port of these principles supports the conclusions asserted. Ekit involved the
ceedings technically are not criminal; but practically they are for they extend the
criminal process of sentencing to include on the same convictions an additional
punishment of deportation. ... [Thus, the instant alien] is about to begin a life
sentence of exile from what has become home, of separation from his established
means of livelihood for himself and his family of American citizens. This is a savage
penalty...
Id. at 243.
90. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
91. Pursuant to Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 20, 39 Stat. 890-91, as amended, Internal
Security Act, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 1010-1012 (1950).
92. A contention that the power to expel was lacking was the basis of Mr. Justice
Douglas' brief dissent. 342 U.S. at 568-69. The objections of the petitioners were not ad-
dressed to the power to expel per se, but raised the question of the effect of this exercise
of the power on their constitutional rights under the first, fifth, and eighth Amendments.
See id. at 529 nn.9, 10.
93. Id. at 534.
94. United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950) ; United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) ; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276 (1922); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) ; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). Also
cited was 3 HAcxwo rH, DIGEST or INTEMNATIONAL LAw 725 (1942).
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power to exclude, and first enunciated the conditional-entry theory of expul-
sion ;9 Fong Yue Ting, despite its broad language, does not support, either
on its facts or upon an analysis of the opinion, unlimited power to expel ;90
Bugajewitz concerned the ejection of an erroneously admitted alien; 91 Ng
Fung Ho involved the power to eject illegal entrants ;9 Curtiss-Wright did
not involve the power to expel, and merely noted that the power to expel, as
it affects external relations, is inherent in sovereignty ;99 finally, Eichenlaub
not only did not consider any constitutional issues, but involved expulsion for
wartime criminal activity. 100 Thus it seems clear that, while the basic power
to expel may have been unquestioned by the petitioners in Carlson, the con-
stitutional issue was one for initial examination, rather than reexamination.
Mr. Justice Reed's attempted justification of his position disclosed further
weaknesses. He continued:
We have no doubt that the doctrines and practices of Communism clearly
enough teach the use of force to achieve political control to give con-
stitutional basis, according to any theory of reasonableness or arbitrari-
ness, for Congress to expel known alien Communists under ,its power to
regulate the exclusion, admission and expulsion of aliens. Congress had
'before it evidence of resident aliens' leadership in Communist domestic
activities sufficient to furnish reasonable ground for action against alien
resident Communists. The bar against the admission of Communists can-
not be differentiated as a matter of power from that against anarchists
upheld unanimously half a century ago in the exclusion of Turner.
[United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904).] Since
"[i]t is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the
deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful,"
[Citing Bugajewitz and the pertinent quotation of that case in Ng Fung
Ho.] the fact that ... [the instant aliens] were made deportable after
entry is immaterial. They are deported for what they are now, not for
what they were. [Citing Mahler, Eichenlaub, and Harisiades.] Otherwise,
when an alien once legally became a denizen of this country he could
not be deported for any reason of which he had not been forewarned at
the time of entry. Mankind is not vouchsafed sufficient foresight to justi-
fy requiring a country to permit its continuous occupation in peace or
war by legally admitted aliens, even though they never violate the laws
in effect at their entry.
10'
Initially, it should be noted that the argument based on the danger posed
by long-term resident alien Communists might have been relevant in a case
involving an attempted exercise of the war power, but it had little to do with
the power to regulate admission and exclusion of aliens, from which the
95. See Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1590-91.
96. See id. at 1591-97.
97. See id. at 1621-25.
98. See text accompanying notes 33-42 supra.
99. See Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1601-02.
100. See id. at 1585 n.55.
101. 342 U.S. at 535-37.
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power to expel was originally derived, since the causal connection between
initial excludability and postentry conduct was not mentioned. Next, the con-
stitutional status of the aliens before the Court was apparently equated to
that of an anarchist who was an illegal entrant, here for a temporary visit,
and who had been considered by the Court excludable.10 2 No one would
argue that Congress could not exclude Communists; but Reed's disregard
of the difference between exclusion and expulsion left a serious gap in his
reasoning. Accordingly, to support his approval of the retroactive imposition
of expulsion statutes, he started with a debatable construction of language
torn from the context of Bugajewitz, and then relied on the only two Su-
preme Court cases dealing with war power expulsion, plus Harisiades, decided
the same day as Carlson.
Furthermore, the fears expressed by Mr. Justice Reed concerning the con-
sequences of accepting a conditional-entry theory of expulsion showed a mis-
understanding of the nature of that concept. The conditional-entry theory
does not necessarily require that once an alien is admitted lawfully he cannot
be expelled except for the breach of express conditions imposed at the time
of entry. Rather, the Government has a reasonable time after admittance to
determine whether its preliminary decision to admit was erroneous or not.
The absence of express statutory conditions at the time of entry is not fatal
to the existence of the expulsion power. What is crucial is whether the post-
entry conduct can be reasonably related to preentry characteristics or con-
ditions.'
03
It might be argued that the result reached in Carlson, which involved
present Communists, was correct, while that of Harisiades, which involved
ex-Communists, was not. This view is supportable if it could be assumed that
the constitutional issues in the two cases were merely questions of congres-
sional power under the war power 104 or of the applicability of the ex post
facto clause. But the language of both cases goes far beyond these considera-
tions and indeed suggests a vaguely defined "sovereign" power to expel, un-
restrained by constitutional limits. Thus, both are antithetical to the theory
advanced here-that absent conditions which justify invoking the war power,
or clear reliance by the alien on his foreign nationality, the power of Con-
gress to expel lawfully admitted, long-term resident aliens can be exercised
only against those who were, or can reasonably be presumed to have been,
excludable on the basis of preentry characteristics.
102. For a discussion of Turner, see Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1598-99.
103. For example, it is submitted that if Congress found that aliens allowed to enter
under existing exclusion laws were developing a dangerous disease, and that the incubation
period of the disease was such that it could be inferred that any alien showing symptoms
within six months after entry had contracted the disease abroad, Congress could act to expel
aliens developing the disease within six months of entry regardless of the nature of the
exclusionary laws at time of entry.
104. Compare Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1585 n.57.
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Harisiades v. Shaughnessy: Precedent Versus Predilection
On the issue of substantive limits to the expulsion power, Carlson is neither
persuasive nor decisive. The constitutional views expressed must stand or fall
with the merits of Harisiades.10 5 The facts of the three cases involved in
Harisiades compellingly presented the issues involved in banishment. Each
alien had entered as a youth, two at thirteen, one at sixteen, in 1914, 1916,
and 1920 respectively. They had, therefore, resided here for 26, 30, and 32
years before arrest in 1946.106 Expulsion was sought under the provisions of
the Alien Registration Act of 1940 107 making past membership in undesir-
able political organizations a ground for expulsion. Obviously, the applica-
bility of the ex post facto clause was a crucial question, and one on which the
petitioners based their attack.108 But the more fundamental issue of the right
to remain as a consequence of lengthy residence and family ties was also
raised.' 0 9 This was the first issue considered by the majority opinion of Mr.
Justice Jackson.
At the very outset, the opinion confounded the issues presented in the case
before the Court and those that had been decided in prior opinions. Thus
Jackson began:
These aliens ask us to forbid their expulsion by a departure from the
long-accepted application to such cases of the Fifth Amendment provision
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. Their basic contention is that admission for permanent
residence confers a "vested right" on the alien, equal to that of the
citizen, to remain within the country, and that the alien is entitled to
constitutional protection in that matter to the same exent as the citizen.
Their second line of defense is that if any power to deport domiciled
aliens exists it is so dispersed that the judiciary must concur in the
grounds for its exercise to the extent of finding them reasonable. The
argument goes to the contention that the grounds prescribed by the Act
of 1940 bear no reasonable relation to protection of legitimate interests
of the United States and concludes that the Act should be declared in-
valid. Admittedly these propositions are not founded in precedents of
this Court."10
Since the question raised concerned substantive due process, while prior prec-
edent had considered questions of procedural due process, there was in fact
no "long accepted application" of the due process clause to overturn in order
to uphold the right of long-term residents to remain. Moreover, while it was
105. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
106. Id. at 581-83.
107. Ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670. Portions of this act are still in force but the deportation
provisions are now found, with some changes, in the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, § 241, 66 Stat. 204-08, 8 U.S.C. § 1251. (1958).
108. 342 U.S. at 584.
109. Ibid. The aliens further contended that their first amendment rights were abridged
by expulsion. Ibid.
110. Id. at 584-85.
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true that no direct precedent applied substantive due process concepts to ex-
pulsion,"' Kellern2 supported the aliens' position in principle."0
Having in effect assumed the conclusion ultimately reached, the opinion
continued by arguing that the petitioners, while enjoying the benefits of
United States residence, had chosen not to accept citizenship but instead had
"prolonged" their original nationalities. 11 4 The unexpressed conclusion of this
argument, when analyzed, is found to rest on unestablished premises. To be
sure, naturalization immunizes a foreign-born person from expulsion, unless
he is subsequently denaturalized." 5 However, the converse of that rule, that
the power to expel exists in the absence of naturalization, does not necessarily
have to follow constitutionally in all cases. Not only is such a position in-
humane, 1 6 but it seems to assume that the alien has deliberately chosen for-
eign allegiance. Indeed, seeking naturalization may precipitate expulsion pro-
ceedings. 17 To adopt the position that failure to become naturalized places
the resident alien indefinitely in the danger of being expellable merely assumes
111. There was, however, Mr. Justice Murphy's concurring opinion in Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 157-66 (1945). See also Mr. Justice Harlan's views in Lem Moon
Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547-48 (1895), quoted in Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases
1613 n.214.
112. Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909).
113. See Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1605-09.
114. 342 U.S. at 585.
1.15. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950).
116. Compare U.S. PRESIDENT'S CO ' N ON IMMIGRATION AND NATUnALiZATION,
REPORT-WHos WE SHALL WELCOME 193 (1953) [hereinafter cited as PnasMxNT's
Co ' x REP.]:
It will be agreed, so long as the law permits aliens to remain in this country without
time limit, that a moral, if not a legal, obligation exists to treat such people fairly.
Especially where, as in this country, the alien is permitted to become a full-fledged
member of the community in which he lives; to be employed, to own property, to
marry and raise a family, to pay taxes, to serve in the armed forces, and otherwise
to participate in all activities save those reserved for citizens, such as voting.
117. This was the case in Harisades. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization,
Political Deporlations in the United States, 14 LAW. Guum Rxv. 93, 122 n260 (1954). See
also Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 23-24 (1939) ; Latva v. Nicolls, 106 F. Supp. 658
(D. Mass. 1952). Fifty-three of the 320 expulsion cases studied by the Common Council for
American Unity "came to the attention of the Service through an application [for natural-
ization] filed by the alien himself." Low.srzxN, THE AiN AND THE IMMIGRATION LAw
165 (1957).
An ex-Communist is eligible to become naturalized if his membership antedates the
application by at least ten years. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 313(c), 66
Stat. 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1424(c) (1958). Of the 254 post-1950 political expulsion cases from
which information was available, 173 had tried to become citizens before expulsion proceed-
ings were initiated, 78 of which were pending at the time of arrest; 1 was unable to apply
for citizenship because of nationality; 9 had been citizens but lost citizenship because of
denaturalization, marriage to an alien, and on other grounds; 5 had believed that they were
citizens by birth, marriage, or derivation; only 66 had made no effort to achieve citizenship.
Appendix to Brief for Petitioner, p. 8 (table 10), Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Rowoldt Appendix].
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the conclusion desired by the Government. Lengthy residence and family ties
with citizens, as well as the possibility that the Constitution might recognize
a third, intermediate status, roughly analogous to a denizen at common
law,"" were ignored.
Finally, the failure to become naturalized does not necessarily assure a con-
tinuance of the original nationality or status."" This fact is demonstrated by
the nondeportable alien, a status which has been recognized by Congress.1 2 0
Nevertheless, presuming as a matter of law that foreign allegiance continued,
Mr. Justice Jackson then assumed the existence of special rights of aliens
based upon it:
So long as one thus perpetuates a dual status as an American inhabitant
but foreign citizen, he may derive advantages from two sources of law-
American and international. He may claim protection against our Gov-
ernment unavailable to the citizen. As an alien he retains a claim upon
the state of his citizenship to diplomatic intervention on his behalf, a
patronage often of considerable value. The state of origin of each of these
aliens could presently enter diplomatic remonstrance against these de-
portations if they were inconsistent with international law, the prevailing
custom among nations or their own practices.
1 1
The speculative nature of the foregoing arguments is obvious. The possibility
of diplomatic intervention is premised on the alien's retention and reliance on
his former nationality or status, a premise unreal precisely because when an
118. The status of denizen, midway between that of an alien and a native-born subject,
was accorded to aliens who obtained letters patent which the Crown could grant as a mat-
ter of royal prerogative. A denizen could take land by purchase or devise, which an alien
could not, but was subject to some of the same disabilities, such as exclusion from public
office. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *375.
Under an early South Carolina statute, an alien resident, upon taking an oath of alle-
giance before a judge, could be deemed a denizen so as to enable him to purchase and hold
real property. See McClenaghan v. McClenaghan, 1 Strob. Eq. 295, 298, 47 Am. Dec. 532
(S.C. 1846).
119. Glaring evidence that lengthy residence in this country may render one stateless
if he is banished is the case of Mezei, who, after a temporary visit abroad was excluded.
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). He was unable to find
any nation willing to accept him. As a consequence he was incarcerated on Ellis Island for
four years before, as an act of executive grace, he was released, See Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 102 n.36 (1958).
120. See, e.g., Act of July 18, 1950, ch. 464, 64 Stat. 343. See also H.R. REP. No. 1192,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7-12 (1949). The very terms of Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, § 242(d), 66 Stat. 211, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (1958), are predicated on the
existence of nonexpellable aliens. See United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201 (1957).
Of 219 cases involving political expulsions between 1944-1952, 40% were not expellable
to their countries of nativity. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Political De-
portations in the United States, 14 LAW. GUILD REv. 93, 112 (1954). Of the 254 post-1950
cases for whom facts were known, in 105 cases the place of birth had become part of a dif-
ferent country. See Rowoldt Appendix 9 (table 11). The Attorney General has likewise
recognized the fact that expulsion to certain countries is impossible. 1955 Ar'y GEN. ANN.
REP. 408.
121. 342 U.S. at 585-86.
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alien becomes permanently domiciled in another country, thereby avoiding the
responsibilities of his former nationality, he forfeits the right to seek diplo-
matic protection.' By residing here permanently, and by seeking the protec-
tion of his constitutional rights as an American resident, the alien probably
waives whatever rights he might enjoy under international law.123 A non-
citizen seeking constitutional protection is not, therefore, as seems to be im-
plied, reprehensibly seeking to invoke the more protective of two sets of
rights. But, even if he were, such a consideration is irrelevant since the con-
stitutional guarantee of due process applies expressly to persons, not merely
to citizens. Besides, if it is true, as the opinion later asserted, that under in-
ternational law every sovereign nation has the right to expel undesirable
aliens, the imagined diplomatic protection is completely illusory, for apparent-
ly there would be no grounds for complaint as long as procedural proprieties
were observed.
The alien's immunities from military service in certain circumstances were
also urged as a reason for denying immunity from expulsion even to long-
term residents." 4 This argument likewise seems fallacious. It is arguable that
the immunity from certain duties is offset by the withholding of rights other
than the right to remain, such as the passport and the vote. But more telling
is the fact that permanent resident aliens are in reality not entirely free from
the duties of citizenship, -1 2 5 even including the bearing of arms.'-( The resident
alien's only "immunity" in this respect appears to be Jackson's recognition
that he is not ordinarily compelled to engage in war against his native coun-
try.127 But it would seem that refusal to do so would be an act of reliance
122. See BORCHARD, DIPOmATIC PRoTmcriox oF CITIZENs AMOAD 810-11 (1915) [here-
inafter cited as BoRcHARD].
"The Court's emphasis on the theoretical advantages of the dual national connection of
the resident alien loses much of its appeal when measured realistically against the alien's
inability to secure benefits from a country he had abandoned, perhaps in flight, many years
before." The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 HARv. L. REv. 89, 106 (1952).
123. Compare BoRcirAI 731-32 (U.S. native's evading the duties of citizenship during
long residence abroad is basis for denying diplomatic protection).
124. 342 U.S. at 586.
125. See Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 61-62 (1892).
126. The Selective Service Act of 1948, as amended, provides that, "except as other-
wise provided... every male alien admitted for permanent residence, who is between the
ages of 18 years and 6 months and 26 years ... shall be liable for training and service in
the Armed Forces of the United States... ." 65 Stat. 76 (1951), as amended, 50 U.S.C.
§ 454(a) (Supp. V, 1958). Congress has, moreover, expressly indicated that permanent
residents should expect to assume the duty of military service. See S. REP. No. 1515, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 354 (1950).
Failure to perform the duty of bearing arms subjects one to subsequent exclusion, as an
alien ineligible to citizenship, Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, §§ 101(a) (19), 212
(a) (22), 66 Stat. 169, 184, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a) (19), 1182(a) (22) (1958). Such conduct
also makes the alien deportable. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 241 (a) (1), 66
Stat 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1) (1958).
127. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 773 (1950).
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on his former nationality, and a consequent rejection of the status of an
American resident. Besides, being an "enemy alien" under such circumstances,
he can be interned and removed. 28 The "right" not to engage in war under
such circumstances seems totally irrelevant to the question of the constitu-
tional status of the resident alien seeking to avoid banishment in time of
peace, and the making of such an argument merely provides one more piece
of evidence of the uncritical homogenization of peacetime and wartime powers.
Mr. Justice Jackson also found it significant that aliens "may enjoy par-
ticular treaty privileges,' 2 9 once again indicating a failure to appreciate the
distinction between aliens who rely on their American residence and those
who rely on their foreign nationality. It is true that treaties may affect the
right of noncitizens to enter and remain here,3 0 but in such cases there is no
basis for claiming protection as an American resident. This fact distinguishes
the early cases dealing with Chinese laborers, who sought protection under
international law as subjects of China entitled to special treaty rights, a posi-
tion which occasioned the Court's initial discussion of the power of sovereign
nations to exclude and expel irrespective of any express constitutional dele-
gation of power.' 3' But the modern immigrant, who enters under the domes-
tic immigration laws regulating foreign commerce, would seem to be in an
entirely different constitutional category.
132
On the basis of the foregoing questionable rationale, Mr. Justice Jackson
then considered the basic question of constitutional power to banish:
Under our law, the alien in several respects stands on an equal foot-
ing with citizens . ... .3 but in others has never been conceded legal
128. Enemy Alien Act of 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577, codified in REv. STAT. §§ 4067-70
(1875), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (1952).
129. The opinion's only citation on this point is BORCHARD 64, which deals with the
issue of military exemption under treaty. Of course, reliance on such a privilege negatives
any right to rely on one's domicil here.
130. See Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231 (1929). Compare Cheung Sum Shee
v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 336, 345 (1925), with Chang Chan v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 346, 351 (1925).
131. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) ; Hesse, The Pre-1917
Cases 1588-89, 1592.
132. Since 1924, before a potential immigrant departs for our country, he must express
an intent to become a permanent resident. Such an alien is admitted pursuant to the general
immigration laws if qualitatively acceptable, and not pursuant to a treaty. Thus, the reason-
ing of Chae Chat; Ping and Fong Yue Ting, both supra note 131, is neither applicable nor
persuasive. See Boudin, The Settler Within Our Gates-Ill, 26 N.Y.U.L. Rrv. 634, 649-50
(1951).
133. The omitted citations, in the order cited, were Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1.18 U.S. 356,
369 (1886) (licensing ordinance cannot discriminate against alien) ; Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33 (1915) (state statute limiting number of aliens who could 'be employed in given place
of business held to violate equal protection clause) ; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142
U.S. 651 (1892) (right to habeas corpus) ; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228
(1896) (alien cannot be subjected to criminal penalties without following criminal pro-
cedure) ; and Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931) (property of
friendly alien corporation cannot be seized without compensation).
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parity with the citizen. Most importantly, to protract this ambiguous
status within the country is not his right but is a matter of permission
and tolerance. The Government's power to terminate its hospitality has
been asserted and sustained by this Court since the question first arose.13
The implicit assumption underlying the entire opinion was finally stated ex-
plicitly: constitutionally, permanent residence short of naturalization is mere-
ly temporary residence. 13 Stating the proposition in such terms reveals its
paradoxical nature. Moreover, just as in Carlson, none of the cases cited to
support this view 131 involved the power to banish the long-term, lawfully
admitted resident. Three did not involve expulsions at all;13T three others in-
volved at most the ejection of short-term residents either actually or pre-
sumptively excludable at entry.138 And, of these six, four were concerned with
Orientals who were racially ineligible for naturalization and who were origi-
nally considered nonassimilable almost as a matter of law.130 The cases most
nearly in point, Bugajewitz and Fong Yuc Ting, when analyzed, also fail to
support Mr. Justice Jackson's position, since both can be understood to have
involved aliens who could not show that they had not been excludable at time
of entry.140 As examples of the termination of the Government's hospitality,
the cases cited may have relevance, but as binding authority for banishment
in an era when manner and time of entry are provable as a matter of course,
they are insufficient.
The opinion's remaining discussion of the substantive due process argument
merely expands upon its uncritical downgrading of the status of the long-term
lawfully admitted resident to that of the illegal and erroneously admitted
134. 342 U.S. at 586-87.
135. But cf. Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 826 (No. 5126) (C.C.D. Pa. 1799). Compare
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (reference to "probationary residence!'
of aliens). See also Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1597 n.123 (discussing possibility that
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), could be read to mean that Chinese
aliens were then temporary residents as a matter of law).
136. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913); Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549
(1913); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912) ; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253
(1905); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Fok Yung Yo v. United
States, 185 U.S. 296 (1902) ; Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901); Lem M1foon
Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698 (1893).
137. United States v. Ju Toy (procedural propriety of administrative determination of
entrant's claim of citizenship) ; Fok Yung Yo v. United States (power to prohibit transit
through United States) ; Lem Moon Sing v. United States (exclusion upon reentry), all
supra note 136.
138. Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189
U.S. 86 (1903) ; Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901).
139. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S.
581, 595 (1889).
140. See Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1591-97, 1621-25.
The only other case cited by Jackson was Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549 (1913), which
does not support congressional power to banish. See Hesse, stpra at 1619-21.
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aliens. But because of the confusion disclosed with respect to the prior hold-
ings regarding the source of the power to expel, its contents require further
examination. Citing the power over enemy aliens in time of war, the opinion
continued:
But it does not require war to bring the power of deportation into exist-
ence or to authorize its exercise. Congressional apprehension of foreign
or internal dangers short of war may lead to its use. So long as the alien
elects to continue the ambiguity of his allegiance his domicile here is held
by a precarious tenure.
That aliens remain vulnerable to expulsions after long residence is a
practice that bristles with severities. But it is a weapon of defense and
reprisal confirmed by international law as a power inherent in every
sovereign state. 14 1 Such is the traditional power of the Nation over the
alien and we leave the law on the subject as we find it.
1 42
Thus, the atmosphere that had pervaded Chae Chan Ping 14' was resurrected;
war and peacetime power were confounded. This failure to differentiate be-
tween the different constitutional powers involved in wartime and peacetime
expulsion almost seems to have led Mr. Justice Jackson to the implicit asser-
tion of a national police power over aliens. He failed to recognize that, in
situations not justifying the use of the war power, the power to expel might
be connected with the power to regulate foreign commerce. In this respect,
both the Carlson and Harisiades opinions represent an unstated rejection
rather than observance of precedent. The cases which first discussed the doc-
trine of inherent sovereignty did so in regard to an entirely different issue-
the power to expel despite treaties with other nations concerning entering or
resident aliens. With respect to the power under domestic law, however, the
constitutionally delegated sources of the expulsion power were carefully speci-
fied. In other words, the power to expel was recognized as a sovereign power
which was exercisable only within the constitutional framework. Disposing of
the constitutional question of the power over the resident alien on the 'basis of
international law, therefore, did not resolve the issue but avoided it. Rather
than leaving the law on the subject undisturbed, Harisiades actually marked
a new departure. To be sure, prior to Harisiades there had been wide accept-
ance of the unlimited power of Congress over the resident alien. But the issue
of the extent of the power had not yet been contested.
Moreover, not only did Mr. Justice Jackson ignore the implications of
141. Here primary reliance was placed on international law authorities, which while
perhaps not irrelevant, are not decisive of a question concerning domestic constitutional
law. The only case cited was, significantly, Fang Yue Ting, which supports such a con-
clusion with respect to the power of the United States vis-i-vis another nation, but not
with respect to direct power over the resident alien since the issue of power over the alien
was considered in Fang Yue Ting in terms of the power delegated by the Constitution. See
Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1593-95.
142. 342 U.S. at 587-88.




Keller, but he showed himself to be unfamiliar with the real history of im-
migration legislation.144 Only after the existence of congressional power has
been assumed is the question of time limitations within which expulsion must
be effectuated mentioned.145 Thus, the true nature of the relationship between
the power to expel and the power to exclude was submerged, and limitations
of time were tested in terms of policy, not power. This resulted in standing
history on its head.
The remaining discussion of the due process issue considered whether the
Court should interfere with legislative policy, obviously avoiding the issue of
upon whom such policies may be imposed. Citing the intricacies of foreign
policy, the danger of communist aggression, and the hardships involved in the
wartime relocation of citizens of Japanese descent, which the Court had pre-
viously approved,140 the Court declined to intervene.147
The concluding passage in Mr. Justice Jackson's disposal of the substantive
due process argument left no doubt that the constitutional rights of resident
144. In an extended footnote, 342 U.S. 588-89 n.15, he purported to outline the history
of immigration legislation. A careful comparison of the footnote with the various acts con-
cerning aliens discloses many errors. For example, he stated that "Congress, in 1907, pro-
vided for deportation of legally resident aliens, but the statute reached only women found
engaging in prostitution, and deportation proceedings were authorized only within three
years after entry." (Emphasis added.) But the act actually dealt with exclusion, creating
a conclusive presumption of erroneous admittance. See Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1616
& nn.240-43. Mr. Justice Jackson thus displayed an unfamiliarity with Mr. Justice Holmes'
opinion in Keller, where he wrote: "For the purpose of excluding those who unlawfully
enter this country, Congress . .. m yj, make their [aliens'] admission conditional." Keller
v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 149-50 (1909) (dissenting opinion). (Emphasis added.)
See Hesse, supra at 1605-09. This misunderstanding of the original concept of deportable
acts as the basis for a conclusive presumption of erroneous entry undermines the entire
opinion.
A substantially accurate survey of the legislation is given in Brief for Mascitti, pp. 12-
17, Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). Although the other errors may perhaps
seem inconsequential in themselves, their cumulative impact is disturbing, since it is im-
possible to appreciate the true import of the early cases, particularly Fong Yue Ting and
Bugaiewitz, without fully understanding the legislation involved.
145. 342 U.S. at 588.
146. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) ; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
Despite the extreme hardships imposed by Japanese relocation, upheld on the most de-
batable grounds, internment is not banishment. Moreover, the action was upheld solely on
the basis of the necessities of war. Harisiades, however, purported to settle the question of
peacetime power. On this point, at least, Mr. Justice Jackson would have to plead guilty
to Jonathan Swift's indictment:
It is a Maxim. among these Lawyers, that whatever hath been done before, may be
legally done again: And therefore they take special Care to record all the Decisions
formerly made against common Justice and the general Reason of Mankind. These,
under the Name of Precedents, they produce as Authorities, to justify the most in-
iquitous Opinions; and the Judges never fail of directing accordingly.
SwIFT, GuI .IvE's Tn.AvLs 203 (Modern Library ed. 1958).
147. 342 U.S. at 588-91.
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Americans had been watered down to the common denominator of interna-
tional law. 148 The opinion stated:
We think that, in the present state of the world, it would be rash and
irresponsible to reinterpret our fundamental law to deny or qualify the
Government's power of deportation. However desirable world-wide anel-
ioration of the lot of aliens, we think it is peculiarly a subject for inter-
national diplomacy. It should not be initiated by judicial decision which
can only deprive our own Government of a power of defense and reprisal
without obtaining for American citizens abroad any reciprocal privileges
or immunities. Reform in this field must be entrusted to the branches of
the Government in control of our international relations and treaty-mak-
ing powers.149
Thus the resident alien was held subject to the diplomatic vicissitudes of
the cold war. This conclusion seems unavoidable in view of the justification
of banishment as an instrument of "defense and reprisal." If this is under-
stood to refer only to the undesirable conduct of the individual alien, then it
approaches the recognition of banishment as punishment. Since Mr. Justice
Jackson refused to adopt such a view, 1 0 however, what he must have meant
in the present context was that the power to banish is a necessary weapon
in international relations. Under this view, the individual character of the
alien resident is ignored and the conduct of the government in power in the
country of his nativity or, even worse, the government of still another coun-
try, say Russia or Communist China, is allowed to determine his constitu-
tional status. Even assuming that such a view makes any constitutional sense,
in practice the principle upon which it is based is aborted. Communist coun-
tries will not accept our political rejects.' 51 Of the three aliens involved in
Harisiades, one was of Russian nativity, but the others were born in Greece
and Italy, 152 friendly nations, where the deportees, if they currently held
dangerous political views, could be just as harmful to the United States as if
they remained. Such results are to be expected, however, so long as the power
to banish is treated as a political rather than a constitutional question. Poli-
tical motivations often involve, almost by definition, short-term expediencies.
What is needed, instead, is a rational, humane and permanent constitutional
policy.
After rejecting summarily the claim that deportation violated the aliens'
148. See Borchard, The "Minimum Standard" of the Treatment of Aliens, 38 Micn.
L. REv. 445 (1940).
149. 342 U.S. at 591.
150. See note 156 infra and accompanying text.
151. See United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 179-80 (1952) (dissenting opinion of
Jackson, J.).
And aliens may not be deported to countries where they would be executed or imprisoned.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1958).
152. 342 U.S. at 581-83.
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first amendment right of free speech,153 Mr. Justice Jackson turned to the
problem of retroactively making past membership in a class ground for ex-
pulsion.
The remaining claim is that this Act conflicts with Art. I, § 9, of the
Constitution forbidding ex post facto enactments. An impression of retro-
activity results from reading as a new and isolated enactment what is
actually a continuation of prior legislation.
During all the years since 1920 Congress has maintained a standing
admonition to aliens, on pain of deportation, not to become members of
any organization that advocates overthrow of the United States Govern-
ment by force and violence, a category repeatedly held to include the
Communist Party. These aliens violated that prohibition and incurred
liability to deportation. They were not caught unawares by a change of
law. There can be no contention that they were not adequately forewarned
both that their conduct was prohibited and of its consequences." a
In denying that the statute as applied involved any practical retroactivity,
the opinion ignored the significance of the fact that the "standing admonition"
of the 1920 act applied only to present members.155 Arguably, the former
statute gave notice to aliens that if they abandoned their communist activities,
they would not be deported. It did not in itself notify them that Congress
reserved the power to change the law so that even a sincere change of heart,
made perhaps in reliance on existing law, would later prove to have been of
no avail. Thus, the argment here rests on the implicit assumption that Con-
gress has power to vary the deportable classes at will, with no duty to inform
an alien that certain conduct will subject him to deportation, while other
courses of action remain safe.
That the decision actually rested on these grounds was next made explicit.
Resorting to the traditional distinction between criminal and civil penalties,
the opinion continued:
However, even if the Act were found to be retroactive, to strike it down
would require us to overrule the construction of the c.z post facto pro-
vision which has been followed by this Court from earliest times. It al-
ways has been considered that that which it forbids is penal legislation
which imposes or increases criminal punishment for conduct lawful pre-
vious to its enactment. Deportation, however severe its consequences, has
153. 342 U.S. at 591-92. The propriety of this holding, however, is questionable since
the opinion relied solely on Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), which involved
present leaders of the Communist Party. The Court held in Dennis that the then existing
circumstances met the test of clear and present danger. Just how the past activities of those
involved in Harisiades constituted either a clear or a present danger was not entirely ex-
plained. See also United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201 (1957).
154. -342 U.S. at 593.
155. See Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939). The Supreme Court had recognized
that at least as late as 1927, there was some doubt as to whether the Communist Party did
in fact advocate the overthrow of the government by force and violence. See Schneiderman
v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943). Compare Maisenberg v. United States, 356 U.S.
670 (1958) ; Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958).
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been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure.
Both of these doctrines as original proposals might be debatable, but both
have been considered closed for many years and a body of statute and
decisional law has been built on them.r 6
Stare decisis is an irrelevant answer to constitutional questions of major
import. But the two expulsion cases relied on at this point 117 did not settle
the issue before the Court in any event. Far from precluding the application
of the ex post facto clause to expulsion proceedings in general, Bugajcvitz
merely determined that because of erroneous admittance, either actual or pre-
sumed, the statute involved had not been retroactively applied. 16 8 Mahier, on
the other hand, did uphold retroactive legislation but it was of a different
category, concerned with the removal of aliens convicted of wartime crimes. 10
A relevant inquiry, moreover, is what had become of the basic assumption
underlying the Court's opinion in Jordan v. DeGeorge?100 Perhaps it was
DeGeorge which compelled Mr. Justice Jackson to argue alternatively that
the act was not retroactive in legal effect. For, clearly, the ruling that the
ex post facto clause does not apply to expulsion statutes is fundamentally
inconsistent with the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. If an
alien is entitled to reasonably communicative notice as to the consequences of
his future acts, then how can the lack of any prior notice be held constitu-
tionally valid ?
Mr. Justice Jackson argued further that the earlier cases which had held
civil disabilities to be subject to the ex post facto clause involved criminal
penalties in civil disguise. But this distinction should only make the applica-
bility of the clause to banishment all the more apparent. For the cases which
held that ejection proceedings were not criminal in nature dealt with persons
whose status had been obtained erroneously or by fraud, 10 1 and thus cannot be
validly applied in the banishment situation. That banishment is punishment
156. 342 U.S. at 594. (Footnotes omitted.)
157. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924) ; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913).
158. See Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1623-25.
159. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
160. 341 U.S. 223 (1951.).
161. He thus purported to distinguish Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810);
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Ex parle Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333 (1867) ; and Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1873), relying on
Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 385 (1878). But how the deprivation of the right to act
as a priest (Culzmings), to practice law (Garland), or to enjoy access to state courts
(Carskadon), by means of an expurgatory oath concerning past confederate activities is
more of a criminal sanction than expulsion of a long term resident alien for past political
activities is not explained. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) which, in effect,
restated the theory of Cummnings and Garland in procedural due process terms. Moreover,
Burgess in fact followed rather than distinguished the earlier cases, indicating that the
retroactive imposition of an additional tax would violate the ex post facto clause. But cf.
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). The expulsion cases are collected by Mr.




had, moreover, been emphatically recognized by Mr. Justice Jackson only the
year before in DeGeorge.
162
Finally, the conclusion of the opinion disclaimed any constitutional neces-
sity of recognizing the possibility of reformation when past conduct is all that
supports the expulsion, asserting that:
When the Communist Party as a matter of party strategy formally ex-
pelled alien members en masse, it destroyed any significance that discon-
tinued membership might otherwise have as indication of a change of
heart by the individual. Congress may have believed that the party tactics
threw upon the Government an almost impossible burden if it attempted
to separate those who sincerely renounced Communist principles of force
and violence from those who left the party the better to serve it. Con-
gress, exercising the wide discretion that it alone has in these matters,
declined to accept that as the Government's burden.10
Judicial relief was thus denied on the basis of conduct of third parties over
whom the aliens could probably exercise no control. Admittedly, difficulty of
proof was the motivating factor behind the early provisions substituting proof
of postentry conduct for proof of initial excludability. But under those pro-
visions the undesirable conduct which gave rise to the presumption was that
of the alien himself. In the present argument, however, difficulty of proof was
said to justify setting up an irrebutable presumption of present undesirability
based on past conduct, a process which in itself seems questionable.10 As
applied here, however, the process went even further, for in effect, the pre-
sumptions were pyramided: presumed excludability being established by pre-
sumed character.
Taken together, Carlson and Harisiades marked a decisive departure in
American law. Nonetheless, while Harisiades attempted to put the question
of power to banish beyond debate, it has not been accepted by the Court as
the final word on the subject.
Galvan v. Press: Precedent as a System of Morals
The validity of the provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950,165 which
eliminated the necessity of proving that the Communist Part, advocated over-
162. 341 U.S. at 243 (dissenting opinion).
163. 342 U.S. at 595-96. This argument was made in the face of the fact that Carlson,
decided the same day, involved present members of the Communist Party. See notes 91-
104 supra and accompanying text.
164. As authority for the power to deport under international law the Court [in Had-
siades] cited 1 OPF.PHuI, INTERATiONAL LAw 498 (3d ed., Ro.xburgh, 1920)
and 4 MfoopE, INTEPNRzATIONAL LAw DIGEST 67-96 (1906). However, a widely quoted
corollary to this power is the requirement that determination of undesirability be
made in each case. See 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONTAL Lw 230-31 (2d rev. ed. 1945);
BORCHARD, DIPLOwATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZEmS ABROAD 50-51 (1915).
The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 HARV. L. REv. 89, 105 n.44 (1952). Compare },fahler
v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
165. Ch. 1024, § 22, 64 Stat. 1006-1010 (now incorporated in scattered sections of Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1952)).
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throw of the government by force and violence, was questioned in Galvan v.
Press.160 The case involved an American resident who had first entered in
1918 and had "since resided here with only occasional brief visits to his native
country [Mexico]. 'u 67 He contended that to deport him without giving him
an opportunity to prove that he had not been aware of the party's principles
denied him due process of law.168 The opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
assumed an understanding approach to the substantive due process argument.
[C]onsidering what it means to deport an alien who legally became part
of the American community, and the extent to which, since he is a "per-
son," an alien has the same protection for his life, liberty and property
under the Due Process Clause as is afforded to a citizen, deportation
without permitting the alien to prove that he was unaware of the Com-
munist Party's advocacy of violence strikes one with a sense of harsh
incongruity. If due process bars Congress from enactments that shock
the sense of fair play-which is the essence of due process--one is en-
titled to ask whether it is not beyond the power of Congress to deport
an alien who was duped into joining the Communist Party, particularly
when his conduct antedated the enactment of the legislation under which
his deportation is sought. And this because deportation may, as this
Court has said in Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284, deprive a
man "of all that makes life worth living"; and, as it has said in Fong
Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10, "deportation is a drastic measure
and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile."
In light of the expansion of the concept of substantive due process as
a limitation upon all powers of Congress, even the war power, see
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 155,
much could be said for the view, were we writing on a clean slate, that
the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political discretion hereto-
fore recognized as belonging to Congress in regulating the entry and
deportation of aliens. And since the intrinsic consequences of deportation
are so close to punishment for crime, it might fairly be said also that the
ex post facto Clause, even though applicable only to punitive legislation,
should be applied to deportation. 169
Although the tone was decidedly different from Harisiades, clearly the con-
clusion was to be the same. Mr. Justice Frankfurter equally assumed that
Congress had unlimited discretion to designate undesirable classes of aliens
and to deport members of those classes. No new awareness of the actual legis-
lative or judicial history of immigration law was displayed. In fact, although
recognizing the existence of compelling considerations which might well have
led to the jettisoning of any precedent, including Harisiades, which indicated
that congressional power was unlimited in scope, the opinion instead appealed
to an erroneous interpretation of history to support exactly that conclusion.
But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of Congress
under review, there is not merely "a page of history," New York Trust
166. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
167. Id. at 523.
168. Id. at 530.
169. Id. at 530-31.
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Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349, but a whole volume. Policies pertain-
ing to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly
concerned with the political conduct of government. In the enforcement
of these policies, the Executive Branch of the Government must respect
the procedural safeguards of due process. The Japanese Immigrant
Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49.
But that the formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Con-
gress has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial
tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government. And what-
ever might have been said at an earlier date for applying the e.r post
facto Clause, it has been the unbroken rule of this Court that it has no
application to deportation.
We are not prepared to deem ourselves wiser or more sensitive to
human rights than our predecessors, especially those who have been most
zealous in protecting civil liberties under the Constitution, and must
therefore under our constitutional system recognize congressional power
in dealing with aliens, on the basis of which we are unable to find the
Act of 1950 unconstitutional. See Bugajewit . v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585,
and Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 280.10
This argument is a glaring example of the inherent dangers of applying the
doctrine of stare decisis to constitutional questions.' 71 What was decided in
the past does not necessarily have direct relevance to the human problems of
today. Precedent may suggest earlier views of those faced with analogous or
similar problems, but "an expression in an opinion yields later to the impact
of facts unforeseen."172 When thought becomes crystallized as dogma, how-
ever, reliance is too readily placed on words rather than thought. Thus, Gal-
van discarded the fate of thousands of human beings, not on the basis of past
thought, but on present interpretations of past texts. The slate may have been
dirty by the time Mr. Justice Frankfurter considered it, but it was the gloss
of recent judges which had rendered it illegible and totally divorced from the
human realities involved.
Thus, the attempt to place the blame for the failure to end the concededly
inhuman consequences of according absolute power to Congress on the
shoulders of Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis ("those who have
been most zealous in protecting civil liberties") was made doubly objection-
able by the misconception of the precedents which such an attempt revealedY' 3
Ng Fung Ho involved the ejection of illegal entrants, Bugajewitz the ejection
170. Id. at 531-32.
171. It is appropriate to note Mr. Justice Frankfurter's subsequent recognitin that
blindly following precedent is not permissible "especially ... in constitutiunal controver-
sies." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 51 (concurring opinion).
172. Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609, 619 (1926) (dissenting opinion of
Brandeis, J.).
173. Compare Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (concurring
opinion of Frankfurter, J.). In Latva v. Nicolls, 106 F. Supp. 658, 660 (D. Mass. 1952),
Judge Wyzanski pointed out that the majority opinion in Harisiades left room for some
substantive due process limitations on congressional power over aliens, but cited Frank-
furter's concurrence as possible authority for an opposite view.
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of an erroneously admitted resident; none of the aliens concerned had resided
here more than five years. The human issues involved in those cases were
vastly different from those presented in Galvan. In fact, Mr. Justice Holmes,
in his opinion in Keller, had expressly conceded to Congress only limited con-
trol over the postentry conduct of resident aliens.
174
A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF THE IMMIGRATION POWER
The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of his-
tory. History must be a part of the study, because without it we
cannot know the precise scope of rules which it is our business to
know. It is a part of the rational study, because it is the first step
toward an enlightened scepticism, that is, toward a deliberate recon-
sideration of the worth of those rules. When you get the dragon out
of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you can count his
teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength. But to get him
out is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame
him and make him a useful animal. Mr. Justice Holmes 175
Since the inhumanity of banishment was recognized in .Galvan, which was
justified solely on misconceived precedent, a fresh consideration of the con-
stitutional basis of the expulsion power is both permissible and desirable.11 0
What is urged is not a radical new theoretical departure, but rather a re-
examination of the implications of the conditional-entry theory. Under this
theory, the power to expel is an adjunct of the power to exclude, which in
turn is derived primarily from the power to regulate foreign commerce. 177
The expulsion power is thus inherently limited by the requirement that its
exercise-except perhaps in situations justifying the use of the war power or
where there is clear reliance on foreign nationality-be reasonably related to
the regulation of new immigration.
Thus, Congress clearly possesses the power to eject. In the words of Mr.
Justice Holmes:
174. Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 149-50 (1909) (dissenting opinion). More-
over, Keller involved a conclusive presumption of past undesirability on the basis of ad-
mittedly undesirable present conduct, which is far less objectionable than a conclusive pre-
sumption of present undesirability predicated on ambiguous past conduct, upheld in Galvan.
175. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARe. L. Rnv. 457, 469 (1897).
1.76. In Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957), banishment was avoided by ques-
tionable statutory construction, but Galvan was not overruled. In Latva v. Nicolls, 106 F.
Supp. 658, 665 n. (D. Mass. 1952), banishment was avoided by an act of executive grace
on the part of the Attorney General. Such isolated incidents are not substitutes for the
application of appropriate constitutional safeguards.
Furthermore, failure to provide safeguards for the alien may result in the battle against
banishment being fought in connection with the rights of the denationalized native born.
See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 65 n.6 (1958) (dissenting opinion of Warren, C.J.);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958). See generally Comment, 64 YALE L.J. 1164
(1955).
177. See Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1582-1609. Compare Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S.
44, 65 n.6 (1958) (dissenting opinion of Warren, C.J.).
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Congress may require, as a condition of the right to remain, good be-
havior for a certain time, in matters deemed by it important to the pub-
lic welfare and of a kind that indicates a pre&xisting habit that would
have excluded the party if it had been known.'7 8
When an expulsion is based on preentry characteristics, it bears an obvious
relationship to foreign commerce. The alien with whom ejection deals is an-
other country's problem, the product of a foreign society. Expulsion of such an
alien can be said to be a necessary and proper measure designed to relieve
this country of the burdens which might follow an erroneous decision to ad-
mit him.
But there comes a point in time after which the alien's conduct can no
longer be reasonably related to his preentry characteristics. The various eco-
nomic and social forces of our society have molded him to the extent that he
can no longer be regarded as a foreign product. The expulsion of such a
person, which is here termed banishment, cannot reasonably be regarded as
a regulation of immigration. It is an attempt to deal with our own internal
problems, to control the conduct of products of our own society.170 Congress'
assertion that it has but to find certain conduct undesirable and then order
the expulsion of aliens indulging in such conduct can thus be regarded as the
assertion of a broad police power over the alien population. Indeed, both the
administration and the consequences of banishment suggest that it is punish-
ment.'8 0 It is submitted that no such general police power over aliens
exists'18 '
1V8. Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 150 (1909) (dissenting opinion).
179. The President's Commission, after setting forth the facts with respect to several
examples of expulsion, concluded:
Each of these aliens is the product of our society. Their formative years were
spent in the United States, which is the only home they have ever known. The
countries of their origin which they left-in two cases during infancy, in another, at
the age of 5 years-certainly are not responsible for their criminal ways. Their
criminal careers are American, not foreign, products. If such a person offends against
our laws, he should be punished in the same manner as other citizens and residents
of the United States and should not be subject to banishment from this country. We
cannot expect other countries to take, and continue to take, undesirable people who
have no real tie with them.
PRESIDENT'S Comm'x REP. 202.
The fact that infant immigrants who later become undesirable are the product of our
society was eloquently recognized by Judge Learned Hand in Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158
F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir. 1947) ; United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F2d 630, 631 (2d
Cir. 1926).
180. For recognition of the consequences of deportation, see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 98 (1958) (dictum) ; United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 178 (1952) (dissenting
opinion of Jackson, J.) ; Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). The prospect of
possible banishment has been held sufficient to prevent an appeal from a criminal conviction
being dismissed as moot. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946).
As to the administration of the program, see Committee on Immigration and Natural-
ization, Political Deportations in the United States, 14 LAW. Guxn Rav. 93, 112 (1954):
The deportation laws seem often to have been administered with a view to imposing
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For after a long-term residence, the only difference between the alien and
his citizen neighbors lies in the alleged foreign allegiance of the alien. Argu-
ably, this difference is significant. Indeed, the more or less articulate premise
of the currently accepted view of congressional power over aliens seems to be
that to impose limits on the power to expel would be to cripple this country
internationally, by depriving the Government of a necessary power of defense
and reprisal.' 8 2 But a critical look at the basic theory underlying this argu-
ment will show that it is fallacious.
The concept of continuing foreign ties seems to be the consequence of an
uncritical extension of the rule that in time of war enemy aliens are subject
to special treatment on the basis of presumed loyalty to the country of nativ-
ity, which in turn is based on the theory that the resident alien owes only
temporary allegiance to this country,'1 3 and in time of war is duty bound to
act in the interests of the enemy country from which he originally emigrated,
even though he came here as an infant.'8 4 But even conceding that in times
of war Congress may be said to have no obligation to determine which enemy
aliens are in fact loyal and which disloyal does not justify extending the pre-
sumption to times of peace. Perhaps there may have been some merit to the
theory of temporary allegiance at a time when many immigrants came here
intending only to work for a number of years and then to return with their
savings to their homes and families abroad and when the sheer volume of
immigration was so great that to require inquiry into such matters in deporta-
tion proceedings would have seriously obstructed legitimate expulsions. But
the quantity of immigration has now been greatly restricted, and, since 1924,
the question of intent to become a permanent resident must be determined
on deportees various penalties other than deportation, such as incarceration, the
financial expense of lengthy litigation, continuous personal insecurity, loss of em-
ployment. This hypothesis is supported by a study of three... factors in the cases:
the countries of origin of the deportees; their detention without bail and the amount
of bail required pending conclusion of their cases; the length of the proceedings.
See also H.R. REP. No. 1192, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949), admitting that deportation
orders could be expected to be nonenforceable in the vast majority of cases owing to the
inability of the immigration service to procure travel documents. It would seem that If
expulsion were the object of deportation proceedings, the availability of travel documents
could be determined before the proceedings were put into motion. Cf. United States v.
Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957).
181. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 76 (1941) (dissenting opinion of Stone,
J.) ; cf. Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909).
182. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591 (1952).
183. See, e.g., Radich v. Hutchins, 95 U.S. 210, 211 (1877) ; Carlisle v. United States,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154 (1872).
184. The alien enemy is bound by an allegiance which commits him to lose no oppor-
tunity to forward the cause of our enemy; hence the United States, assuming hint
to be faithful to his allegiance, regards him as part of the enemy resources. It there-
fore takes measures to disable him from commission of hostile acts imputed as his
intention because they are a duty to his sovereign.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 772-73 (1950).
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prior to entry.8 5 To presume, therefore, that the majority of the present alien
population is here on a temporary basis is not only unrealistic, but is incon-
sistent with the terms of our immigration laws. In addition, if an alien is a
permanent resident, to presume a continuing loyalty to another nation is
irrational in view of the human roots that are put down during lengthy resi-
dence and the alien's loss of any international-law basis for the protection of
-his rights by his native country. And, if such presumptions are irrational,
then the deprivation of American residence on the basis of such presumptions
is unconstitutional.1s6
At worst, the political loyalty of long-term resident aliens might be con-
sidered ambiguous, as was suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson in Harisiades.
This could, for example, possibly justify Congress' barring them from sensi-
tive jobs for which proof of undivided loyalty is considered a valid require-
ment. But short of war or a clear retention of ties with the country of nativ-
ity, such an argument has no relevance to the question of whether long-term
resident aliens are subject to expulsion. For, being long-term residents, their
present political beliefs and activities are the product of this rather than some
other society. This does not mean that they are immune from criminal sanc-
tions for any unlawful activities, any more than citizens are immune. Nor
does it mean that if a particular alien in fact engaged in sabotage or acted as
an agent for the country of his nativity he might not be expelled, for then
his retention of foreign ties would be clear. But such facts should be estab-
lished in an appropriate judicial proceeding, relating to the specified individ-
ual and his acts, and not by legislative fiat.
Moreover, it should be remembered that the majority of expulsions do not
involve considerations of political loyalty,' 87 or involve them only to the ex-
185. See notes 23-31 sumra and accompanying text.
186. A conclusive presumption must rest on a rational connection between the ultimate
fact presumed and the facts that are proven. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-68
(1943) ; McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916) ; Luria v. United
States, 231. U.S. 9, 25 (1913) ; Mobile, J. & K.C.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910).
"[W]here the fate of a human being is at stake the presence of the evil purpose may not
be left to conjecture." Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 149 (1945).
This argument is also clearly applicable to a conclusive presumption of initial exclud-
ability derived from postentry conduct. Unless the legislature may attach the same con-
sequences to the facts giving rise to the presumption as to the facts presumed, the pre-
sumption is an unconstitutional infringement of the judicial function. See Heiner v. Don-
nan, 285 U.S. 312, 329 (1932) ; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 239-40 (1926) ;
Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94, 99-100 (7th Cir. 1953). Thus, if postentry conduct of
aliens is subject to congressional regulation only as an incident of the power to exclude,
then prescribing postentry conduct totally divorced from the immigrant's character at the
time of entry as a grounds of expulsion is invalid.
187. There are no figures available concerning expulsion from the United States by
cause prior to 1908. The totals for the years 1908-1948 are as follows: criminals, 33,556;
narcotic offenders, 2,179; immoral classes, 14,814; mental or physical defectives, 26,254;
persons previously expelled or excluded, 25,023; overstay of term of authorized residence,
29,055; improper or fraudulent entry, 141,161; abandonment of status of admission, 1,483;
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tent that it may be said that this country need not harbor another nation's
undesirable human products. But prostitutes and gangsters who have spent
most of their lives in this country are not another nation's human products,
regardless of where their national loyalty may nominally lie. In short, the
presumption of foreign allegiance is irrational in many instances and irrele-
vant in most. In the few cases in which the presumption is relevant and can
be rationally made, or when it can be shown that the alien in fact has foreign
ties, the war and foreign relations powers give Congress an adequate means
of dealing with him. 18 Thus the assumption of an unlimited power over all
aliens-stemming from "sovereignty"-is both unjustified and unnecessary.
Acceptance of the idea that the power to expel is ordinarily limited to
ejection based on proved or reasonably presumed preentry characteristics
would have the merit of enabling courts to escape the paradoxical position of
eloquently recognizing that banishment is in fact punishment,18 9 while insist-
ing that it is in theory merely a regulatory measure. 00 Obviously, if expul-
sion is the "revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted,"'191 it must be re-
garded as a mere civil sanction.1 92 But to characterize banishment as the
"revocation of a privilege" merely assumes the existence of a continuing
power to expel alien residents. For if the power to expel is constitutionally
limited, then at the point in time after which a presumption of his preentry
excludability can no longer be rationally made, the alien can be said to have
contract laborers, 2,591; public charges, 22,086; illiterates, 16,754; anarchists, etc., 1,255;
Chinese laborers, 2,962; and miscellaneous, 9,051. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
873-74 (table5) (1950).
188. But to concede a power to banish under the war power is not to concede unlimited
"national emergency" powers. After Harisiades, at least one court still felt that substantive
due process standards derived from the first and fifth amendments limited congressional
power over aliens. Latva v. Nicolls, 106 F. Supp. 658 (D. Mass. 1952). Yet by drawing
a distinction between speech and association, the court was able to hold that the deporta-
tion of an alien who had entered in 1916 at the age of 13, maintained an inactive member-
ship in the Communist party in 1934 and 1935, and had apparently remained completely
loyal to the United States ever since, was within the power of Congress. Id. at 659-62. It
is submitted that if the Government had been forced to justify its action in terms of peace-
time power instead of a vague general police or national emergency power over aliens,
such a decision would not have been so easily reached. Compare Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases
1585 n.57.
189. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) ; Lehmann v. United States,
353 U.S. 685, 691 (1.957) (dissenting opinion) ; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 164 (1945)
(concurring opinion) ; DiPasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir. 1947); United
States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, 631 (2d Cir. 1926).
190. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, supra note 189, at 531 ; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 595 (1952).
191. The quotation is from Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
192. See id. at 399 n.2. In this footnote, Mr. Justice Brandeis classed disbarment pro-
ceedings in the same category with expulsion proceedings. In this connection, compare
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (expulsion), with Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353
U.S. 252, 266-73 (1957), and Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957)
(evidence of former communist connections does not justify exclusion from bar).
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acquired the right to remain.' 93 And the deprivation of lawfully acquired
rights may correctly be regarded as punishment and the power to impose this
punishment limited by the Constitution. 194 This theory is not only more in
accord with the human realities involved in banishment than is the presently
accepted view, but it harmonizes completely with the cases on which the pres-
ent theory is based, since those cases involved illegal or erroneously admitted
entrants. 195
Finally, the recognition that the power to expel is inherently limited and
that banishment is punishment would make clear the applicability of the
various external limits proposed and rejected in the prior cases. This would
give the alien the rights which the Constitution accords to "persons," end-
ing the anomalous practice of protecting his property 101 while allowing the
residence on which his life and liberty may truly be said to depend to be
taken away at the Government's will.
CONCLUSION
There are occasions when it is for America to make precedents, and
not to obey them. We should, if possible, prove a teacher to pos-
terity, instead of being the pupil of bygone generations. More shall
come after us than have gone before, the world is not yet middle-
aged. Herman Melville 17
The acceptance of the preceding constitutional theory would achieve results
similar to those urged elsewhere on sociological 10s and policy grounds.19 9
Obviously, the acceptance of inherent constitutional limits to the power to
expel would result in the recognition of an intermediate class of nonexpellable
193. Cf. Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 697 (1958) (referring to alien's "right of
lawful presence") ; Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 150 (1909) ("right to remain")
(dissenting opinion).
194. It will be recalled that the basis of Mr. Chief Justice Fuller's dissent in Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 761 (1893), was his belief that the aliens before the
court were in fact lawfully admitted. See Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1593. Accordingly,
he argued that "limitations exist or are imposed on the deprivation of that which has been
lawfully acquired." 149 U.S. at 762.
195. See note 161 supra.
196. Cf. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931) (property of
alien corporation).
197. MELVILE, WHrE JAcKcET 150 (Evergreen ed. 1956) (dealing with flogging in
the United States Navy).
198. See Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Political Deportations in the
United States, 14 LAw. Gumin REv. 93, 99-100 (1954).
199. "The Commission recommends ... that no alien should be subject to deportativn
who entered the United States for permanent residence before reaching the age of 16 years,
or who was lawfully admitted for permanent residence and has resided in the United States
for 20 years.' PR SinTz's Com'x REP. 205.
Of 219 political expulsions between the years 1944-1952 studied, 96% of those for whom
facts were available would not be subject to expulsion under the recommendation of the
Commission. Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, supra note 193, at 101.
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noncitizens. But such an idea is not unusual. The English common law recog-
nized denizens, whose status, intermediate between citizens and aliens, was
obtained by executive grace.2 0 0 Only recently the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the power to create a class of denationalized native born.20 1 More to
the point, as a practical matter nonexpellable aliens exist under present im-
migration laws.2 0 2 American law has, moreover, recognized examples of non-
expellable noncitizens such as American-born Indians, 203 and noncitizen na-
tionals .2 4 Neither history nor logic stand in the way, therefore, of constitu-
tional recognition of the human consequences of lengthy American residence.
The acceptance of a class of nonexpellable noncitizens would, on the con-
trary, merely avoid the precise cases in which the courts have heretofore
searched their souls, as well as the statutes, for a means to circumvent con-
gressional intent. In tenaciously retaining the inhumanity of banishment as a
part of our constitutional system we can only injure our standing as an ad-
vanced, humane society. In this connection, it is noteworthy that both Fong
Yue Ting v. United States 205 and Plessy v. Ferguson,200 decided three years
200. See note 118 supra.
However, the term denizen was apparently used in two senses: a natural born subject,
and an alien who has been made a denizen by letters patent of the Crown. See Levy v. Mc-
Cartee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 102, 117 (1832).
That one enjoying the status of a denizen would have the right to remain here was
apparently assumed in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 723 (1893). But see
Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 826, 835 (No. 5126) (C.C.D. Pa. 1799).
The Enemy Alien Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798), codified in REv. STAT. §§ 4067-70
(1875), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (1952), recognizes denizens, providing that "all
natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government" shall be subject
to its provisions. This provision has precipitated some judicial consideration of the mean-
ing of the term. See United States ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl, 46 F. Supp. 689, 691 (S.D.N.Y.
1942), giving various dictionary definitions of "denizen," and holding that one who had
resided and worked in Austria from 1922 to 1938 was a denizen of that country, and since,
after Austria became a German state, he remained for a short period, he was also a denizen
of Germany within the meaning of the Enemy Alien Act. See also United States cx reL
Zdunic v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 858, 861 (2d Cir. 1943).
201. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
202. See note 120 supra.
203. Citizenship was not conferred on native-born Indians until 1924. Act of June 2,
1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253. See also Act of Jan. 25, 1929, ch. 101, 45 Stat. 1094. But Con-
gress, in excluding them from the definition of "alien" as used in both the 1917 and 1924
acts, was careful not to attempt to expel them. Ch. 29, § 1, 39 Stat. 874; ch. 190, § 28(b),
43 Stat. 168.
There is the further possible example of free Negroes prior to the ratification of the
fourteenth amendment. Cf. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
204. The definitions of "alien," cited note 203 stupra, had also excluded from their scope
the noncitizen national, who had been held not subject to exclusion. Gonzales v. Williams,
192 U.S. 1 (1904). But this fact did not prevent Filipinos from having the status of an alien
thrust upon them even though they had acted upon their American nationality and had
come to this country. See Rabang v. Boyd, 353 U.S. 427 (1957).
205. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
206. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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later, were constitutional products of the nineteenth century. Yet only one
week before Galvan v. Press,20 7 which refused to reconsider the constitutional
issues supposedly settled by Fong Yue Ting despite the recognized merits of
a different view, the Court in Brown v. Board of Educ.-08 refused to follow
Plessy.20 9 It seems safe to suggest, moreover, that while the international con-
sequences of rejecting the power to banish would be as favorable to our in-
terests and standing as those flowing from Brown,210 the domestic conse-
quences, in contrast, would be negligible.
It is time that we fully recognize that our nation was built to a great ex-
tent by the labor of aliens,21 1 and that we owe it to the nations who have
given us their youth, to the native-born children and spouses of aliens, and to
the alien population itself, to accept the responsibility for our orn human
products, good or bad. American history does not support banishment---uni-
versally decried by civilized people."2 '2 But even if it did, the rule supporting
such inhuman power should be rejected "as a relic from a different era.11
2 1 3
This does not mean that Congress should be denied full power to reject im-
migrants, but merely that the power to expel which is, after all, implied from
the implied power to exclude, should be recognized as one of those classes
of cases calling for "limitation to the least possible power adequate to the end
proposed.1
214
207. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
208. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
209. It should be noted, moreover, that Plessy was decided by a 7-1 majority, while
Fong Yue Ting enjoyed the support of only 5 justices. See Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases
1592 n.97.
210. We cannot develop an effective foreign policy if our immigration laws negate our
role of world leadership. We cannot defend civil rights in principle, and deny them
in our immigration laws and practice. We cannot boast of our magnificent system
of law, and enact immigration legislation which violates decent principles of legal
protection.
PazsmwNr's Comirx REP. xv.
211. See Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270 (1876); PEsmr's
Comi'N REP. xiv.
212. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (opinion of Warren, C.J.). See also
United States ex rel. Konis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, 631 (2d Cir. 1926) (L Hand, J.).
213. The quotation is from Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12 (1957) (Black, J.).
214. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955) ; Anderson v. Dunn,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821.). See also Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138
(1909).
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